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Abstract: This paper investigates the major determinants of non-performing loans in the MINT (Mexico, 
Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) economies. Identifying major determinants of non-performing loans, which 
are observed to be growing in these countries in recent time, will also guide policy and forecasting future 
levels that will be useful for pre-emptive policies and actions. It uses static panel data and dynamic panel 
model analyses. Evidence suggests that in the four economies, capital adequacy ratio, liquidity ratio, total 
bank credit andreturn on assets are significant bank-specific determinants of non-performing loans. Also, 
while the return on assets, liquidity ratio and capital adequacy ratioshow a negative and significant 
relationship with non-performing loans, nominal exchange rate, money supply growth rate, total bank credit 
and lending rate show positive and very significant relationships with non-performing loans. Finally, 
corruption, an institutional variable, shows a very strong positive relationship with non-performing loans.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Background: The acronym ‘MINT’, which was first coined by British economist Jim O’Neill, former chairman 
of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, represents Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey. O’Neill had come up 
in 2001 with the now-popular BRIC acronym (hitherto unknown), which later in 2010 got extended with the 
letter ‘S’ to make it BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). BRICS countries later organised 
themselves into a political and economic alliance. O’Neill (2014), after the11 September 2001 terror attacks, 
had the conviction that Europe and the United States (US) were confronted with economic decline. In his 
opinion, developing countries could benefit enormously from globalisation and fire-up the global economy. 
Common and major drivers of the prospects for the MINT economies include young and expanding 
populations. In theory, this is expected to lead to a persistent boost to domestic consumption, contrary to the 
demography of countries such as China with an ageing population. For instance, in 2013, Turkey's economy 
grew 10.3% faster than China’s, and was the third fastest growing world economy (World Bank, 2014). 
Economic growth came mainly from construction (6%) rather than exports, such as in China and Russia. In 
addition, the MINT countries are at an advantage due to their respective geographic positions. Mexico 
benefits from increasing demand for exports from the US in recent years, Indonesia in Asia is in contiguity 
with the likes of China and Australia, Nigeria even though in West Africa can easily be a pivot of Africa’s 
economy, while Turkey in the European Union, is positioned as an access point into Asia and Africa (Akpan, 
Isihak & Asongu,2014). 
 
Non-performing loans (NPLs) have been identified as a factor that limits the effectiveness of the banking 
sector in promoting the economic growth (see Boudriga, Taktak & Jellouli, 2010). In the global financial 
stability report of International Monetary Funds (IMF), NPLs’ level was seen as an old risk presenting new 
challenges and countries with high NPLs incidents have been advised to examine some factors that might be 
responsible for the upsurge in the cases of NPLs while those with relatively low incidents are encouraged to 
press harder in order to get better (IMF, 2013). The burden of NPLs reduces liquidity and causes low 
profitability in banks, limits credit expansion to viable economic entities, and confines economies to low 
growth as the real sector slows down with the attendant rise in unemployment. Unfortunately, credit, which 
sometimes births NPLs, is the oil that greases economies and is unavoidable (Klein, 2013). Even though the 
definition of NPLs is not uniform across countries, the IMF (2004) provided a definition that represents a 
general convergence of the term.  A loan is deemed to be non-performing if payments (principal and/or 
interest) due have not been paid for at least 90 days. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 5-tier 
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system classifies loans into five categories: pass, special mention, sub-standard, doubtful and virtually lost. Of 
these, the last three classes of loans are the non-performing loans.  While the first category refers to a healthy 
loan, special mention loans may currently have no outstanding payments but collections problems may be 
foreseen. However, the term ‘impairment’ is used in place of the term ‘non-performing’ by international 
accounting and banking standards. Sound Practices 7 and 11 of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
and the International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39 refer to such loans as being impaired. 
  
Just like Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey (MINTs or MINT countries), BRICS were a set of newly 
industrialised and developing countries, which were identified for their fast growing economic potentials. In 
the Goldman Sach’s projections in 2006, by 2050, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey are expected to rank 
5th, 7th, 11th and 14th respectively by 2050. The MINT countries have some attributes in common. They are 
all emerging economies that lie between 15th and 21st place in the world in terms of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and all have population and geographical location advantages. All the MINT countries have youthful 
and expanding populations. Even though the largest four emerging market-developing economies are BRIC, 
and the next four are South Korea, Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey, Nigeria is justifiably included with the other 
three countries in this batch of countries. The reason is that Nigeria is within the ten Big Emerging Market 
(BEM) with the largest economy in Africa and regarded both a regional power in Africa and middle power in 
international affairs. Also, Nigeria could grow at an average minimum of 5% over the next 35years up to 2050 
while established emerging economies such as China is expected to moderate to between 3% and 4% over 
the same period (PWC, 2015). Their model predicts Nigeria having the highest GDP growth rate over the 
same period of 5.4% in domestic currency. Although, other problems confronting the MINT economies 
include mammoth bribery and corruption, poor infrastructure development, weak institutions, governance 
issues, high levels of debt, and inadequate education systems, it is believed that if the problem of non-
performing loans can be fixed, banks will be in a more pole position to provide the needed catalyst for 
boosting the growth of these economies, and consequently push these economies to a higher level of growth 
(International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2013).  
 
Myriads of studies preceded the first official meeting of BRIC in 2009 in Russia. For instance, in projecting the 
pathway for economies till 2050, Wilson & Purushothaman (2003) suggested that the G6 could have a smaller 
economy than BRIC in US Dollar terms by as early as 2039. This study and some others before it seek to be a 
part of pioneers on MINTs. For instance, Akpan et al. (2014) studied the determinants of FDI in Fast-Growing 
Economies, comparing the BRICS and the MINTs. Durotoye (2014) analysed the MINTs as a possible emerging 
economic power bloc, putting into focus the crisis of youth unemployment. Öztürk & Yildirim (2015) obtained 
ambiguous results in their test of the evidence of long-run panel causality test in the study of environmental 
Kuznets curve hypothesis in the MINT Countries. Asongu & Kodila-Tedika (2015) compared the drivers of 
growth between the BRICS and the MINT countries. Finally, Kokotović & Kurečić (2016) analysed the basic 
economic trends in the MINT countries and obtained results that seem to suggest a significant role in 
international relations as regional powers for the MINT countries. NPLs have been identified as the main 
cause of banking system crises in these countries (See Desmet, 2000; De Luna-Martinez, 2000, for Mexico; 
Fofack, 2005; Carney, 2009, for Indonesia; Aminu, Dogarawa & Sabari, 2014; Adeyemi, 2011; Somoye, 2010, 
for Nigeria; Karabulut, Bilgin & Danisoglu, 2010; Özatay, Sak, Garber & Ghosh, 2002, for Turkey).  
 
Furthermore, of concern is the fact that despite efforts by these countries, NPLs have been rising again. In 
spite of this realization by administrators of these economies, policies have failed to rein-in this problem as 
NPLs persist, rising over the last 4 years (after 2010 to 2014) by about 159%, 191%, 206% and 106% (but 
153% in the last 3 years) in Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey and Nigeria respectively in absolute terms. This 
portends a real lurking danger to MINTs’ financial stability and economic growth when juxtaposed to 
international benchmark of a maximum of 5% annual growth of NPLs (Anderson, 2011). Facing this situation 
by economies identified for their potentials and future role in global economy puts this perspective in 
probable jeopardy and requires attention. The projection set by the IMF and others thus appears to be 
severely threatened with this trend for the MINT countries as only an efficient banking sector can provide 
enough credit flow to drive investment and economic growth. Therefore, it is believed that if the factors that 
determine non-performing loans can be thoroughly examined, it will provide insight into ways in which the 
rising trend of non-performing loans in the MINT countries can be pegged back (Hu, Li & Chiu, 2004 and 
Fofack, 2005), ultimately paving the way for pre-emptive policies and actions. Consequently, the major 
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objective of this study is to identify those important factors that determine non-performing loans and their 
individual relative impacts in MINTs, whose realisation of potentials, hinges on a healthy banking system. 
This study contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence on the determinants of NPLs in MINT 
countries, using the institutional variable (corruption) which had never been used in similar studies on these 
countries in the past. Moreover, MINTs is a relatively new economic bloc conception that so far has not 
enjoyed much attention from researchers. As far as we know, this is the first study of non-performing loans in 
the MINT economies as a ‘bloc’. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The importance of credit to an economy cannot be over-emphasized. Friedman (1994) argues that a measure 
of credit is associated with nominal GDP, while Stiglitz (1989) maintains that money is important because of 
its relationship with credit. The institutional link between money and credit is enabled by the development of 
fractional reserve banking which combines loans with deposits (Cochran & Call, 2000). Moinescu (2012) 
argues that strong increases and decreases in credit are the transmission channel of the dynamics of non-
performing loans. This corroborates the work of Jakubik & Moinescu (2015) who link contracting credit to 
the growth of NPLs, likening it to inefficient resource allocation by banks. He further linked the dynamics of 
NPLs to the difference in banks’ credit to the private sector, which is measured as a percentage of GDP. He 
argues that some macroeconomic variables as well as market variables determine the size of NPLs. In his 
opinion, macroeconomic variables such as economic growth enhance the capacity to repay. Conversely, 
financial market variables such as the exchange rate and interest rates lower capacity for repayment. In 
modelling credit, Zeng (2012) views loans to the economy as boosting total consumption and hence yielding a 
positive social utility, while NPLs are viewed as a source of financial pollution, which negates social utility. He 
identifies two economic implications of NPLs. Firstly, economic growth could decline if NPLs grow, causing 
resource allocation inefficiency. Secondly, capital requirements will increase as a result of the growth of NPLs 
as erosion of capital occurs due to funds being trapped in entities, making it impossible for the banks to fund 
new, economically viable ventures. 
 
In terms of empirical studies, Studies on NPLs can be divided into five categories. The relevant tranche of 
literature to this study views NPLs at macroeconomic level across countries using the aggregate level of NPLs. 
Under this tranche, disaggregation of loan types across sectors within a group of countries is sometimes done 
in order to view NPLs irrespective of the category of determinants. The proposed study falls partially into this 
category. For instance, Beck, Jakubik & Piloiu (2013) investigated the macroeconomic determinants of NPLs 
in a group of 75 countries using 10-year data. Using panel data analysis as the estimating technique, they first 
selected possible factors based on theory and a priori expectation. Their results, which are robustly validated 
using the Random effect model framework, suggest that significant determinants of NPLs are the lending rate, 
the exchange rate, the real GDP growth rate and share prices. In terms of share prices, greater impact was 
found in countries with a larger stock market relative to GDP ratio. For the exchange rate, countries with 
managed or pegged exchange rate systems seem to have unhedged borrowers of foreign exchange and this 
determines the direction of the effect on NPLs. Makri, Tsagkanos & Bella (2014) studied the determinants of 
NPLs in the banking system of 14 countries in the Euro zone covering a period of nine years focusing on both 
bank-specific and macroeconomic variables. The study used the aggregate level of NPLs and employed the 
difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) as the estimating technique. The results suggest that there 
is a significant relationship between NPLs and macroeconomic variables such as unemployment, public debt, 
and the GDP growth rate. The study also found that bank-specific variables such as capital adequacy ratio, 
return on equity and NPLs of the previous year contributed significantly to the level of NPLs.  
 
Financial Crisis and NPLs: Economic depressions trigger the level of NPLs and the deterioration in economic 
fortune shoots up the risk of non-performing loans (Sinkey and Greenawalt, 1991). The world has witnessed 
more financial crisis in the last ten years probably as a result of liberalization of financial systems (Yang, 
2003). In the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, there had been a rapid rise in the level of NPLs across 
those economies (Wade, 1998; Yang, 2003). Further worsening of NPLs’ level accompanies financial crisis 
(Louzis et al., 2012). But some researchers are of the opinion that the beginning of a financial crisis can be 
highlighted by a rise in NPLs’ level (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). NPLs in any economy, is one of the drivers of 
banking crises. Banks can create money through credit expansion to the system and also make significant 
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portion of their earnings through loan creation (Vodova, 2011). Banks undertake different risks in order to 
remain in business, but a credit risk which is positively related to banking crises, is the main risk carried by 
banks (Yang, 2003; Fofack, 2005). Credit risk is the risk that borrowers may not pay back, thereby, making 
loans become NPLs.  NPLs reflect the stability of the banking system and largely the financial system since 
historically, a built-up level of NPLs has often been found to be associated with banking crises (Fofack, 2005).  
This relationship is established in the East Asian banking and financial crisis of 1997, which severely affected 
economic growth in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea, when more than 300 percent increase in NPLs 
level preceded the crisis (Mishkin (1999). Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) further link financial crisis with 
sovereign debt crisis as was the case in Greece. Barseghyan (2010) also argued that the huge level of NPLs in 
Japan accounts in part towards the prolonged slowdown in that economy for over a decade till 2003. Finally, 
the global financial market instability of 2007 was triggered by mortgage defaults, which started from the 
United States of America (USA) mortgage market. The severity of the later spread to different countries of the 
world then depended on each country’s cross-border financial exposure and link to the USA (Leaven & 
Valencia, 2010). 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Model Specification: It is typical of non-performing loans’ empirical models to include macroeconomic and 
bank-specific variables. Representing the work of Moinescu (2012) in functional form, we have: 
 
NPLs = f(credit accelerator, macro, market)……………………………………… (1) 
 
Suppose β is the coefficient of ‘macro’, then, β < 0. Also, suppose ∝ is the coefficient of ‘market’, then, ∝> 0. 
 
According to Moinescu, a credit accelerator is made up of important components such as credit flow (F), 
liquidity ratio (L) and inflation rate. That is: 
Ci,t = f(Fit ,Li,t,πi,t)……………………………………………………………………… (2) 
Few studies that have included institutional variables such as Ahmad (2013) and Goel & Hasan (2011) find 
the same relationship as ‘market’ with the level of NPLs.  
Hence, our model, is therefore hypothesised as follows: 
𝑏𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝑓 𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 , 𝑏𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 , 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑏𝑙𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 , 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 ,   𝑚𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 , 𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡 .............(3) 
Where all variables are as defined in section 3.5. 
 
We consider two main estimating techniques under static panel data analysis and a dynamic panel data 
estimating technique. The first one is a fixed effects model (FEM) (‘within group’ and Least Squares Dummy 
Variable). This allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity across the MINT countries. But this 
technique may yield biased results if fixed effects,πi , is correlated with error term,μit . We proceed to estimate 
the second technique known as the random effects model (REM), which is only appropriate if we think that 
Cov(πi  , Xit )=0. We then conclude by obtaining the results of dynamic estimation utilising systemic 
generalised method of moments (GMM), which helps to overcome the presence of possible endogeneneity in 
our static model through the use of instrumental variables. 
 
Estimation Technique: Panel data analysis: Panel models are basically divided into two: one is the static 
panel model while the other is the dynamics panel model (Bai, 2009). Fixed effect (‘within group’ (WG) and 
least square dummy variable (LSDV)) and random effects are the two static panel models available in the 
panel literature (Hedges & Vevea, 1998; Rowland & Torres, 2004). The literature has supported usage of fixed 
effect (WG) because it is capable of producing what is called consistent estimators, the reason being that 
values are differenced around their various sample means (Blundell, Bond & Windmeijer, 2000). In the case 
of fixed effect, LSDV cross-sectional variation is allowed through the use of dummy variables (Kezdi, 2004; 
Andrews, Schank & Upward, 2006). However, Gujarati and Sangeetha(2007) and Hayes and Preacher(2013) 
cautioned that when the dummy variables become too many, the degree of freedom that is consumed is too 
much and this will have serious implicationsfor the result.  
The equation of fixed effect is given as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  ………………………………………………………… (4) 
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Where intercept is not expressly stated, 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the vector of bank non-performing loans, bnpl, across the MINT 
countries,𝜋𝑖  is the unobserved country-specific effect,𝛽 is a vector of parameter estimates for each of the 
explanatory variables and the constant, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , is a K-dimensional row vector of explanatory variables 
 𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 , 𝑏𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 , 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑏𝑙𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 , 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡    𝑚𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 , 𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡  as defined in section 3.5 
over the time period that variables were observed, and 𝜇𝑖𝑡  is the error term. 
 
For the LSDV equation, we have the following: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝐷𝑗
4
𝑗=2 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡………………………………………………..….(5) 
 
Where 𝐷𝑗  represents the dummy variables for N-1 cross-section of countries. This is the only addition to 
equation (2). This means we have ’dummyindonesia’, ’dummynigeria’, and ‘dummyturkey’ in the equation 
with Mexico being the reference for the others. In other words, other country dummies give intercepts 
relative to the intercept of Mexico. 
 
However, there is the possibility of a multicollinearity problem if the dummy variables are too many and this 
may lead to an endogeneity problem where regressors can be correlated, thus leading to bias and an 
inconsistent estimator (Gujarati& Sangeetha, 2007). For the random effect model (REM), developed by 
Nerlove &Balestra (1996), this aims to account for the possible variable omission in the fixed effects model. 
The basic equation for the random effect model is presented thus: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  ..…………………………………………………………...(6) 
  
Where𝑦𝑖𝑡  is a vector of bank non-performing loans, bnpl, across MINT countries,𝛼 is the constant, 𝛽 is a 
vector of parameter estimates for each of the explanatory variables, 𝑥𝑖𝑡  is a K-dimensional row vector of 
explanatory variables  𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 , 𝑏𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 , 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑏𝑙𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑒𝑥𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 , 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡    𝑚𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 ,  𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 , 𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑛𝑖 ,𝑡 as 
defined in section 3.5, 𝜋𝑖 is within-entity error, and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is between-entity error. Under REM, we assume that 𝜋𝑖  
is random and does not correlate with the explanatory variables. 
 
The Hausman (1978) test is utilised in this study on the appropriateness of either the FEM or REM (see Mutl 
&Pfaffermayr, 2011). 
This study also explores the dynamic panel data approach (see Arellano &Bond, 1991; Eigner, 2009).  This 
method, called the generalised method of moments (GMM) generates a model that improves the performance 
of the estimator.  
The equation of the GMM is thus: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝛽2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡…………………………………………………… (7) 
 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the vector of bank non-performing loans, bnpl, across the MINT countries,𝑊𝑖𝑡 is the vector of 
predetermined regressors including lag(s) of y, intercept, 𝛽𝑖  for i=1,2are parameter estimates for each of the 
explanatory variables, 𝑥𝑖𝑡  is a K-dimensional row vector of strictly exogenous explanatory variables as 
defined in section 3.5 over the time period that variables were observed, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
 
This equation is just a modification of the fixed effect equation with the inclusion of instrumental variables.  
However, system-GMM by Blundell &Bond (1998) and Blundell et al. (2000) was used as this approach 
completely eliminates the problem of weak instrumental variables, which may be possible in the GMM 
version of the dynamic panel data by Arellano-Bond particularly as variables approach a random walk. 
Another advantage of system-GMM it gives room for the inclusion of time-invariant regressors which 
disappears in Difference-GMM. System-GMM uses additional restrictions by using modified instruments with 
lagged differences in addition to lagged levels used by Arellano-Bond. 
 
Data: Data on bank non-performing loans for the MINT countries were sourced from the Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis database. Data on national basis, on official exchange rate, GDP growth rate, money supply growth rate, 
inflation rate, total bank credit to domestic economy, bank liquidity ratio, bank capital adequacy ratio, return 
on assets, return on equity, lending rate (for Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) were sourced from the 
World Bank Tables 2013 edition and reported. The database of Transparency International supplied the 
CorruptionPerceptionIndex (CPI) for the countries. The database for the Central Bank of Turkey is the source 
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for the lending rate of Turkey. The scope of data was 17 years (1998-2014) for all countries. Data are scooped 
on a quarterly basis and the likes of the Corruption Perception Index, which is only available annually, were 
interpolated as in Chow and Lin (1971) and Auffhammer, Hsiang, Schlenker, & Sobel (2013). The main 
limitation of this study relates to reliability of data, particularly on non-performing loans arising from 
representative bias as Bankscope publishes aggregate country data once data from at least four banks is 
received (Breuer, 2006). However, the most accurate data for NPLs are available from 1996 (Greenidge 
&Grosvenor, 2010; Hasan &Wall, 2004. Our data set starts from 1998 to mitigate this limitation. 
 
Variables identification and empirical relationship: The selection of variables for this study is based on 
theory and previous empirical work. The bank capital adequacy ratio (bcar), which is a bank-specific variable, 
is used as in Sinkey & Greenawalt (1991) and Berger & DeYoung (1997). Berger and DeYoung (1997) found 
an inverse relationship between the level of non-performing loans and the bank capital adequacy ratio. The 
banks’ credit to the economy, a bank-specific variable, was used in the work of Boudriga et al., (2010) where 
an inverse relationship was suggested. As a proxy for bank performance, Fofack (2005) and Godlewski 
(2006) used return on assets, ‘roa’ (we have also included return on equity, ‘roe’), and found a negative 
relationship between non-performing loans and roa, which is a bank-specific variable. Also, one important 
determinant of bank performance is the bank liquidity ratio. Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró & Saurina (2014) 
linked this with non-performing loans and we have included this as a bank-specific variable. As a 
macroeconomic variable, lending rate was used by Nkusu (2011) and Fofack (2005) who find a direct 
relationship with non-performing loan levels. Krueger and Tornell (1999) and Benavente, Johnsonand 
Morande, (2003) linked the exchange rate and non-performing loans, and this has also been included as a 
macroeconomic variable. Makin (2007) linked money supply to non-performing loans and thus we have 
included its growth rate in this study as a macroeconomic variable. The GDP growth rate, a macroeconomic 
variable, has also been selected and this is following the work of Kruegerand Tornell (1999), Louzis, Vouldis 
and Metaxas, (2012) and Fofack (2005), who find a negative relationship between economic growth and non-
performing loans. The level of corruption (see Boudrigaet al., 2010; Ahmad, 2013; Goeland Hasan,2011) 
captured by Corruption Perception Index, represents an institutional variable used in this study. There seems 
to be unanimity in previous empirical studies that there is a direct relationship with non-performing loans. 
 
Variables definition and measurement: Where 𝑏𝑛𝑝𝑙 is the total bank non-performing loansmeasured as a 
percentage of gross loans; 
𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑟 isthe capital adequacy ratio measured as the bank capital to asset ratio; 
𝑏𝑡𝑐𝑟 isthe banks’ total credit to private sector measured as a percentage of GDP; 
𝑟𝑜𝑎 isthe banks’ return on assets measured as an average period percentage; 
𝑟𝑜𝑒 is the banks’ return on equity measured in average period percentages; 
𝑏𝑙𝑟 is the annual banks’ liquidity reserve as a percentage of bank assets; 
𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑟 isthe lending rate measured in average period percentage; 
𝑒𝑥𝑟 isthe official exchange rate measured in local currency per US$, period average; 
𝑚𝑠𝑔𝑟 isthe money supply growth rate (broad money growth in average period percentage); 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟 isthe inflation rate measured as consumer price inflation in average period percentage; 
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟 isthe GDP is the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product; 
𝑐𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑛 isthe corruption index for each average period measured from 1=low to 10=high. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
This section of the research work explains the empirical results and findings. It contains the panel estimation 
results as well as the dynamic panel model results. Basic inferences are made after the discussion of the 
results. The first aspect explains the descriptive analysis. 
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Table 1: Fixed effect within group result 
Note: * represents significance level of 10%, ** represents significance level of 5% and *** represents 
significance level of 1%. R-square: Within= 0.745, Between= 0.570,Overall= 0.436, corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.857. F 
statistic: F(11, 241) = 63.87,Prob > F  =    0.000, rho=0.898 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Table 2: Random effect result 
Note: * represents significance level of 10%, ** represents significance level of 5% and *** represents 
significance level of 1%. R-square: Within= 0.722, Between= 0.992, Overall= 0.783, corr (u_i, X)   = 0 
(assumed). Wald chi2(11) = 882.31,Prob > chi2 = 0.0000, rho = 0 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Table 3: Hausman test result 
chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)=        25.01, Prob>chi2 =      0.0091 
Source: Author’s computation 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Capital adequacy ratio -0.787*** 0.000 
Bank liquidity -0.052 0.464 
Total bank credit  0.164*** 0.001 
Return on assets -1.346*** 0.000 
Return on equity 0.015 0.291 
Exchange rate 0.002*** 0.003 
Inflation rate -0.032 0.705 
Lending rate 0.190** 0.038 
Money supply growth rate 0.073** 0.031 
GDP growth rate -0.056 0.444 
Corruption -9.309*** 0.000 
Constant 33.360 0.000 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Capital adequacy ratio -0.755*** 0.000 
Bank liquidity -0.103 0.119 
Total bank credit  0.218*** 0.000 
Return on assets -1.064*** 0.000 
Return on equity 0.013 0.335 
Exchange rate -0.000* 0.080 
Inflation rate 0.019 0.806 
Lending rate 0.319*** 0.000 
Money supply growth rate 0.065* 0.061 
GDP growth rate -0.064 0.377 
Corruption -6.808*** 0.000 
Constant 29.487 0.000 
Variable (b) 
Fixed 
(B) 
Random 
(b – B)  
difference 
Sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
standard error 
Capital adequacy ratio -0.787 -0.755 -0.031 0.000 
Bank liquidity -0.052 -0.103 0.051 0.026 
Total bank credit  0.164 0.218 -0.054 0.032 
Return on assets -1.346 -1.064 -0.282 0.014 
Return on equity 0.015 0.013 0.001 0.002 
Exchange rate 0.002 -0.000 0.0025 0.001 
Inflation rate -0.0318 0.019 -0.050 0.036 
Lending rate 0.190 0.319 -0.129 0.052 
Money supply growth rate 0.073 0.065 0.008 0.000 
GDP growth rate -0.056 -0.064 0.008 0.000 
Corruption -9.309 -6.808 -2.500 0.655 
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Tables 1 and 2 contain the results of the panel model. Both the fixed and the random effects are reported, as 
the Hausman test shows that there is significant difference between the two. From the result of the Hausman 
test, we reject the null hypothesis that the random effects model is the appropriate model to use, and accept 
that the fixed effects model is the appropriate model to use. The use of FEM is further justified as it tackles the 
effect of heterogeneity which would have affected our results. All the same, all the variables that are 
significant in the REM are also significant in the FEM.  The following variables, namely: capital adequacy ratio, 
corruption, lending rate, return on assets, total bank credit, exchange rate, and money supply growth rate, 
appear significant in both models. Both models suggest the nature of the relationship (that is direct or 
inverse) between each of the significant variables and non-performing loans. This is an indication that they 
are likely to be important determinants of non-performing loans in the MINT economies. However, to confirm 
their individual effect the dynamic panel model might be necessary. The R-square of the two models is good. 
The reason is that at least all the determinants account for above 70% variation in the non-performing loans 
of the four economies. To corroborate the R-square results, the two models are tested for overall significance 
through the F-test for fixed effect and chi square test for the random effect. The results show that the two 
models pass the test of overall significance. This shows that the choice of variables used as determinants 
appears to be appropriate. Furthermore, empirical literature has shown that there is a possibility of cross-
sectional dependence in panel results, and this necessitates the need to conduct the test of significant 
differences in intercepts of MINT countries using the fixed effect LSDV as shown below.  
 
Test of difference in intercepts of entities: Fixed effects LSDV (least square dummy variable) 
 
Table 4: Fixed effects LSDV result 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F(14,   241) =   70.38, Prob> F      =  0.0000, R-squared     =  0.8035 
Note: * represents significance level of 10%, ** represents significance level of 5% and *** represents 
significance level of 1%, Source: Author’s computation 
 
Static Diagnostic tests 
 
Autocorrelation: We conduct the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data by testing the null 
hypothesis such that there is no first order autocorrelation. Since Prob > F = 0.0001, we reject the null and 
accept the alternative that there is autocorrelation. 
 
Correlation in residuals: Using Pesaran's CD Test of cross-sectional independence, we investigated the 
correlation of residuals across entities. Confirmation of contemporaneous correlation using this test can lead 
to bias in test results. After testing the null hypothesis that there is no correlation in residuals across entities, 
we obtained a P value of 0.0054. This result leads us to reject the null and conclude that there is evidence of 
contemporaneous correlation. 
Variable coefficient Standard error 
Capital adequacy ratio -0.787*** 0.000 
Bank liquidity -0.052 0.464 
Total bank credit  0.164*** 0.001 
Return on assets -1.346*** 0.000 
Return on equity 0.015 0.291 
Exchange rate 0.002*** 0.003 
Inflation rate -0.032 0.705 
Lending rate 0.190** 0.038 
Money supply growth rate 0.073** 0.031 
GDP growth rate -0.056 0.444 
Corruption -9.309*** 0.000 
Constant 40.068*** 0.000 
Country 2 -26.601*** 0.001 
Country 3 -2.9865* 0.051 
Country 4 5.665*** 0.001 
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Heteroscedasticity: We also investigated evidence of heteroscedasticity in the FEM in which errors are 
assumed to be independently distributed, making our standard error consistent in order to ensure valid 
statistical inference. We conducted the Modified Wald test for group-wiseheteroscedasticity with the null 
hypothesis that there is constant variance (homoscedasticity). The null hypothesis is rejected and we 
conclude that there is evidence of heteroscedasticity in the FEM.  
 
Test of cross-sectional dependence: According to Batalgi (cited in Griffith &Chun, 2014), cross-sectional 
dependence is a problem in macro panels with a long time series. The Breusch Pagan/LM test of 
independence is given as follows: 
 
Table 5: Correlation matrix of residuals 
 __e1      __e2      __e3      __e4 
__e1    1.0000 
 
   
__e2   0.1757 -1.0000 
 
  
__e3   0.2322 -0.2517 1.0000 
 
 
__e4    -0.1950 -0.3644 -0.2559 1.0000 
chi2(6) =    19.996, Pr = 0.0028 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Based on the result obtained, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is cross-sectional 
dependence. Also, as shown in Table 4, there is an indication of cross-sectional dependence in the result. All 
the four dummy intercept variables for each of the countries are statistically significant. Here, Mexico is used 
as the reference intercept for the intercept of the other countries. The implication is that there is presence of 
a cross-sectional specific factor that can have an influence on our result. Three of the significant intercepts are 
at 1% while one is at 10% giving a strong case for the element of cross-sectional dependence noticed in the 
panel. The implication for our findings is that individual countries in the MINT economies are likely to 
possess some peculiar structural and institutional differences that distinguish them from one another, and 
this can have implicationsfor our result. This is inline with the findings of some authors in the past who were 
of the opinion that most economic blocs, such as BRICS and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), do have individual peculiarities that distinguish them from one another. Therefore, the 
result shows that MINT is not an exception in this respect either (Pao, Lin or Chang, 2011). However, the 
LSDV result is also significant at 1% and the R-square is also relatively high showing that over 80% variation 
in the non-performing loans is explained by all the independent variables. It indicates that all the choice 
variables are most likely the core non-performing loans determinants in these economies.  
 
Furthermore, as a result of the outcomes of some of the diagnostic tests conducted, we need to make some 
adjustments. For instance, when there is evidence of contemporaneous correlation of residuals in panels and 
autocorrelation, the use of the standard errors of Driscoll and Kraay (1998) is suggested as a robust standard 
error (Hoechle, 2007). Also, in a situation where heteroscedasticity is present in panels, it is suggested that 
the Huber/White, otherwise referred to as the Sandwich estimator, is used to derive heteroskedastic-robust 
standard errors. Alternatively, in addition to these problems as well as possible endogeneity in our model, 
panel model extension has made it possible to obtain more realistic results using the dynamic panel data. This 
will further help us to ascertain the level of consistency in the result and obtain more efficient estimators (see 
Arellano & Bond, 1991). We therefore proceed to the dynamic panel data analysis. 
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Table 6: Dynamic panel data result 
Dynamic Panel (Arellano-Bond) 
Systemic Dynamic Panel 
(Blundell-Bond) 
Variables Coefficient S.E p value Coefficient S.E p value 
bnpl (L1) 0.7343*** 0.0243 0.000 0.9527*** 0.0151 0.000 
bcar -0.0203 0.0529 0.701 0.0989*** 0.0137 0.001 
Liquidity 0.0484** 0.0227 0.033 -0.0596*** 0.0137 0.000 
Corruption -0.3262 0.4497 0.468 0.3017 0.2122 0.155 
Lending rate 0.0280 0.0337 0.405 0.0874*** 0.0166 0.000 
Inflation rate -0.0728*** 0.0271 0.007 -0.1745*** 0.0166 0.000 
return on assets -1.0885*** 0.0856 0.000 -0.2739*** 0.0370 0.000 
return on equity 0.0565*** 0.0052 0.000 0.0134*** 0.0020 0.000 
GDP Growth Rate 0.0381 0.0249 0.126 -0.0233* 0.0122 0.056 
Bank Total credit 0.0618** 0.0246 0.012 0.0063 0.0151 0.678 
Exchange rate 0.0009*** 0.0003 0.000 0.0001 0.0000 0.104 
Money Supply growth rate 0.0028 0.0103 0.784 0.0420*** 0.0083 0.000 
Constant -0.6339 1.6548 0.702 -0.9954 0.7981 0.212 
Note: * represents significance level of 10%, ** represents significance level of 5% and *** represents 
significance level of 1% 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Dynamic panel data: This study employs systemic GMM, which is generalised method of moments, to 
analyse the dynamic panel data. Aside from being able to deal with endogeneity issue in the dataset used in 
the study, the choice of SYS GMM is based on Hsiao & Tahmiscioglu (2008) who were of the opinion that the 
selection of instrumental variables under the GMM, that is the Arellano and Bond (1991) version, is not 
completely appropriate. They advise the use of SYS GMM, which is the version of Blundell and Bond (1998) 
for dynamic panel data. Endogeneity always arises from error in measurement, simultaneity and omitted 
variable. Just as in Louzis et al. (2012), we identify bank-specific variables as sources of endogeneity using 
internal instruments but acknowledge that identifying instrumental variables that are valid is a challenge in 
econometrics. Maddala (1977) queries where such variables could come from (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). All 
the same, the result of both versions for our study shows the use of instruments to deal with endogeneity as 
contained in Table 6. 
 
The result of the SYS GMM in Table 6 also confirms that many of the variables that were found to be 
significant in the static panel model are also significant in the SYS GMM. Notwithstanding, the SYS GMM result 
further shows that liquidity ratio, inflation rate and GDP growth rate have joined the pool of variables that 
may constitute major determinants of non-performing loans in the MINT economies. A growing non-
performing loans level stunts growth as allocated resources are trapped with unproductive economic agents 
(Keeton & Morris; 1987; Krueger & Tornell, 1999; Fofack, 2005; Louzis et al., 2012; Škarica, 2013). When the 
economy is growing, with likely associated income rise, financial capacity which reduces economic burden is 
enhanced and this in turn is expected to reduce financial distress (also see Nkusu, 2011).  Also, since bank 
performance has an influence on risk-taking by managers, this is corroborated by the significance of the ROE 
as a determinant of non-performing loans(Fofack, 2005).Furthermore, as in Makri et al. (2014), the level of 
NPLs in the previous year is found to be positively significant in determining the NPLs level. In conclusion, 
capital adequacy ratio, liquidity ratio, return on assets, exchange rate, lending rate and GDP levels are major 
variables that have individual significant impact on the magnitude of non-performing loans in the MINT 
economies. But we need to conduct some tests on these results so that we can ascertain their validity. 
 
Dynamic Diagnostic Test: We proceed to test for validity of instruments utilized in the model. This can be 
done using the Sargan Test even though Roodman (2009) cautioned about the use of this test when many 
instruments are utilised. The puzzle here is that what constitutes too many instruments is not clear in the 
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literature (Ruud, 2000). The two important requirements of an appropriate instrumental variables are that of 
their orthogonality with the error term and correlation to the endogenous variable(s). The systemic dynamic 
panel data results can only produce the correct results given valid moment conditions. The validity of 
moment conditions can be tested only when they are overidentified and this cannot be tested when they are 
exactly identified in a model. The Sargan Test is that of the null hypothesis that the overidentifying 
restrictions are valid. Rejecting the null hypothesis means that our model’s instrumental variables need to be 
reconsidered except we attribute the rejection to the presence of heteroscedasticity (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). In our overidentified model with 163 instrumental variables generated, the result of the Sargan Test is 
produced Prob > chi2 =0.0000. This leads us to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative 
hypothesis that the instruments used are invalid (http://www.stata-press.com/data/r13/abdata). As 
recommended by Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman (2007). the validity of results should be doubted once the null 
hypothesis of Sargan Test is rejected. 
 
We now turn our attention to generating standard errors that are robust for some reasons. Firstly, some 
underlying regression model assumptions are violated and this leads to invalid statistical inference 
culminating in invalid results obtained in the chosen fixed effect models. Secondly, our model is not dynamic 
in nature and instruments used for the systemic dynamic panel analysis has been found to be statistically 
invalid. In Hoechle (2007), ‘White’ standard errors help to obtain heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates. 
This robust estimate assumes that residuals are independently distributed and standard errors obtained are 
consistent even in spite of heteroskedastic residuals. The clustered standard error otherwise called Rogers 
further relaxes the assumption of independent distribution of residuals also helps to obtain 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) estimates. Dealing with panel residuals that are 
temporal and spatially dependent as well as heteroskedasticity was earlier achieved with feasible generalized 
least squares (FGLS) otherwise known as Parks-Kmenta method. Standard error estimates obtained here are 
consistent to disturbances that are not homoscedastic, autocorrelated and contemporaneously cross-
sectionally autocorrelated. But this is deemed inappropriate for use in microeconomic panels that are not 
small because SE is either unacceptably small or N is greater than T. The panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) of Beck and Katz (1995) demonstrates superiority in this manner to the FGLS. But Driscoll and Kraay 
(1998), making use of Newey-West standard error demonstrates more appropriateness of use when N gets 
large.  The Newey-West estimator is the best HAC approach to an instrumental variable-GMM problem (Baum 
et al., 2007). Hence, we shall conduct these tests to obtain valid results and compare outcomes as follows: 
 
Table 7: Robust result (1) 
Estimating Technique Standard Error adjusted for  Robust Standard Error 
   4 countries (FE ROBUST)  (FE CLUSTER) 
Variables Coefficient S.E p value Coefficient S.E p value 
bcar -0,787* 0,273 0,064 -0,787*** 0,134 0,000 
Liquidity -0,052 0,074 0,531 -0,052 0,071 0,464 
Corruption -9,309** 2,599 0,037 -9,309*** 0,924 0,000 
Lending rate 0,190 0,145 0,282 0,190** 0,091 0,038 
Inflation rate -0,032 0,030 0,362 -0,032 0,084 0,705 
return on assets -1,346* 0,501 0,075 -1,346*** 0,213 0,000 
return on equity 0,015 0,030 0,664 0,015 0,014 0,291 
GDP Growth Rate -0,056 0,213 0,811 -0,056 0,073 0,444 
Bank Total credit 0,164* 0,057 0,064 0,164*** 0,050 0,001 
Exchange rate 0,002** 0,001 0,033 0,002*** 0,001 0,003 
Money Supply growth 
rate 0,073** 0,017 0,023 0,073** 0,033 0,031 
Constant 33,360 6,807 0,016 33,360 3,857 0,000 
sigma_u 14,207 
 
  14,207 
 
  
50 
 
sigma_e 4,785 
 
  4,785 
 
  
rho 0,898 
 
  
0.898 (fraction of variance due to 
u_i) 
 Wald chi2(11) 
  
  
  
  
Prob> chi2 
  
  
  
  
 R-squared     
 
      
Note: * represents significance level of 10%, ** represents significance level of 5% and *** represents 
significance level of 1% 
 
In our results under White standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity, bank capital adequacy, 
return on assets and corruption are statistically significant and have a negative relationship with level of 
NPLs. In contrast, lending rate, bank total credit to the private economy, exchange rate and money supply 
growth rate demonstrates positive relationship to NPLs levels and are statistically significant. The Rogers and 
FGLS produce similar results and fairly different significant levels on rare occasions. For instance, bank 
capital adequacy, return on assets and corruption (this seeming puzzle is explained below) are statistically 
significant and have a negative relationship with level of NPLs. In contrast, lending rate, bank total credit to 
the private economy, exchange rate and money supply growth rate demonstrates positive relationship to 
NPLs levels and are statistically significant. Under these estimates, lending rate is the only additional variable 
found significant compared to the White standard errors. Further, the Newey-West standard errors produced 
the results of Rogers and FGLS and in addition, a result that suggest that liquidity ratio has a statistically 
significant negative relationship with the NPLs levels. This is consistent with the literature that a higher level 
of liquidity in banks is accompanied by a lower level of NPLs (Jimenez et al., 2014). Conversely, the PCSEs 
produced results that are almost similar to Newey-West but different only in exchange rate which is 
insignificant but ultimately is of the same effect because the coefficients are both zero. 
 
However, the individual relationship between the non-performing loans and each variable shows that the 
lending rate has a positive and significant impact on non-performing loans in the MINT economies. This result 
is similar as in some of the previous literature that postulates a direct relationship between the two. The idea, 
according to this literature, is that an increase in the lending rate leads to a rise in the non-performing loans 
because borrowers become more irresponsive to lending rate increases. Also, borrowers’ debt servicing 
capacity is expected to be weakened by a high interest rate (see Nkusu, 2011; Fofack, 2005). Therefore, non-
performing loan is expected to show positive relationship with interest rate. Among the bank specific ratios, 
capital adequacy ratio appears to have one of the highest impacts on non-performing loans. It is significant in 
all the models. This is in support of literatures that tied non-performing loans to moral hazard (see Sinkey 
and Greenwalt (1991) and Berger and DeYoung (1997)). The implication is that the bank-specific factors such 
as capital adequacy ratio are an important variable that can be used to control the volume of non-performing 
loans in the banking sector (Louzis et al., 2012). According to Berger and DeYoung (1997) the importance of 
moral hazard is linked with the capital adequacy ratio, the higher the capital adequacy ratio the more 
guaranteed the corporate existence of the bank and the less the management tendency to go after low quality 
loan. 
 
Table 8: Robust result (2) 
Estimating Technique Cross-sectional time-series Lin. Reg., correlated panels Regr. with Newey-West 
   FGLS regression  corrected st.d errors (PCSEs)  standard errors 
Variables Panels: Homoscedastic Coefficient S.E p value Coefficient S.E p value 
  Estimated Autocorrelation = 0       
 
    
  Coefficients S.E p value       
 
    
Bcar -0,755*** 0,134 0,000 -0,755*** 0,129 0,000 -0,755*** 0,257 0,004 
Liquidity -0,103 0,064 0,111 -0,103 0,062 0,099 -0,103* 0,061 0,092 
Corruption -6,808*** 0,637 0,000 -6,808 0,475 0,000 -6,808*** 0,705 0,000 
Lending rate 0,319*** 0,073 0,000 0,319* 0,069 0,000 0,319*** 0,103 0,002 
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Inflation rate 0,019 0,074 0,801 0,019 0,077 0,808 0,019 0,126 0,883 
return on assets -1,064*** 0,207 0,000 -1,064*** 0,179 0,000 -1,064*** 0,177 0,000 
return on equity 0,013 0,013 0,323 0,013 0,013 0,321 0,013 0,013 0,301 
GDP Growth Rate -0,064 0,071 0,366 -0,064 0,057 0,261 -0,064 0,126 0,610 
Bank Total credit 0,218*** 0,037 0,000 0,218*** 0,026 0,000 0,218*** 0,041 0,000 
Exchange rate 0,000* 0,000 0,073 0,000 0,000 0,122 0,000* 0,000 0,086 
Money Supply growth rate 0,065* 0,034 0,055 0,065** 0,026 0,015 0,065* 0,038 0,089 
Constant 29,486 2,282 0,000 29,486 1,926 0,000 29,486 2,719 0,000 
 Wald chi2(11) 925,7 
 
  1598,69 
 
  126,65 
 
  
Prob> chi2 0,000 
 
  0,000 
  
0,000 
 
  
 R-squared       0,7834           
Note: * represents significance level of 10%, ** represents significance level of 5% and *** represents 
significance level of 1% 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Further, the individual relationship between the non-performing loans and the exchange rate shows a 
positive and statistically significant relationship on non-performing loans in the MINT economies. This result 
agrees with most of the previous literature that postulates a direct relationship between the two. This 
connotes that an increase in exchange rate tends to increase non-performing loans as the cost of servicing 
foreign-denominated loans rises (Beck et al., 2013). Also, capital adequacy ratio appears to have one of the 
highest impacts on non-performing loans. It is significant in all the models. This is in support of literature that 
tied non-performing loans to moral hazard (see Sinkey & Greenawalt, 1991; Berger & DeYoung, 1997). The 
implication is that the bank-specific factors, such as capital adequacy ratio, are an important variable that can 
be used to control the volume of non-performing loans in the banking sector (see Louzis et al., 2012). The 
higher the capital adequacy ratio, the more guaranteed the corporate existence of the bank and the less the 
management tendency to go after low-quality loans. Also, among the bank specific variables, total credit and 
return on assets both have a significant impact on non-performing loans. This is an indication that the volume 
of credit in the economy alongside and the return on assets of the banks have strong links with non-
performing loans in the MINT economies. Indeed, Godlewski (2006) used return on assets as proxy for bank 
performance and concluded that non-performing loans are negatively related to return on assets. The 
tendency is that managers whose bank’s ‘ROA’ is high are not motivated to go after low-quality assets in 
desperation to cover performance. Inefficient bank managers tend to shore up profitability performance by 
engaging in loans of low quality. 
 
A supposed exogenous (institutional) variable included in the model, which is the corruption index, 
corroborates findings in literature showing a positive and very significant relationship with the non-
performing loans in both models. Indeed, it has the highest coefficients of all the determinants of non-
performing loans in the MINT economies. Even though the sign is negative, the correct interpretation lies in 
the description of the data by Transparency International which ranks corruption from 1 (highest corruption 
level) to 10 (lowest corruption level). Hence this means the higher the ranking towards lowest corruption 
level, the lower the level of non-performing loans. Again, several studies in the literature have pointed out 
that the prevalence of corruption in many developing countries in the world is aggravating the problem of 
non-performing loans in the banking sectors of these economies. They show that the MINT economies are not 
exempted (see Boudriga et al., 2010; Goel and Hasan, 2011; Ahmad, 2013). Considering all the results, it 
appears that lending rate, exchange rate, money supply growth rate, corruption, capital adequacy ratio, total 
credit, liquidity ratio and return on assets are likely to be strong determinants of non-performing loans in the 
MINT economies.  
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5. Conclusion and Implications 
 
The study has empirically studied the determinants of non-performing loans in the MINT economies. 
Ultimately, the study confirms that bank capital adequacy ratio, return on assets, returnon equity, bank 
liquidity, total credit, lending rate, exchange rate, money supply growth rate, corruption and GDP levels are 
important determinants of non-performing loans in the MINT economies. They account for about83% 
variation in the volume of non-performing loans in the MINT economies. Again, capital adequacy ratio, bank 
liquidity and return on assets are the strongest bank-specific variables that affect non-performing loans. This 
underscores the importance of avoidance of moral hazard as a panacea for non-performing loans in the 
banks. Also, a rise in bank performance as measured by return on assets puts less pressure on managers to 
book loans recklessly, hence leading to a reduction in non-performing loans. Another conclusion that can be 
drawn from the study is that a lending rate increase can aggravate the problem of non-performing loans in 
the MINT economies. This implies that an excessive interest rate charged on loans by banks contributes to the 
upsurge of non-performing loans. The literature reveals that borrowers become more resistant to loan 
repayment in this situation; in other words, loan defaulters are most likely to be on the rise with an increase 
in the lending rate when the capacity to pay is encumbered. Concluding on the determinants, 
sinceinstitutional, macroeconomic and bank-specific variables have shown up as determinants of non-
performing loans, these identified factors have to be combined in order to properly model non-performing 
loans in the MINT economies. 
 
Finally, since the results have shown that there is likelihood of cross-sectional dependence, an area for 
further research will be to individually appraise each economy and find out what peculiar features might 
distinguish them from one another in terms of non-performing loans and the MINT economies. On policy 
implications, we recommend that policy-makers in these countries should focus more on the major 
determinants identified in this study and proactively bring up policies that will rein-in the current observed 
growth in NPLs in order to avoid its undesired consequences.For instance, institutions should be 
strengthened in a manner that will encourage transparency and discourage corruption. Also, subject to 
policy-consistency and availability of options to the monetary authorities in ‘MINT’ countries, policy choices 
should tilt more towards those that will lower interest rate because of its direct influence on lending rates. 
Furthermore, reasonable stringent measures should be applied to the growth of money supply and its various 
drivers. Finally, in terms of bank-specific determinants, the banking supervisory agencies in ‘MINT’ countries 
should bolster capital and liquidity of banks to benchmarked standards. This creates the requisite shock-
absorbers against NPLs’ rise and its attendant consequences. On academic front, MINTs align with the 
findings of some authors in the past who were of the opinion that most economic blocs, such as BRICS and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)have individual peculiarities that 
distinguish them from one another. 
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